Nietzsche [she writes] attribute divine agency to an ontologically creative language" (198) . Only Vico and Nietsche therefore understand the strangeness of the existential situation of the first humans. For the first humans, it was in a sense the absence and not the presence of a world that both enabled and obliged them to speak, and in so doing to create the historical world. While Heidegger's approach is less originary and anthropocentric than this, Luft observes that the praxic, poietic being of the first humans was the being not of subjects but of "wholly embodied, historically situated beings-in-the-world' (199) , that is, of human beings understood not as Cartesian subjects but as Dasein. The possibility and indeterminacy that induced them to speak a new world into being is just Heidegger's Lichtung or "clearing," the existential space in which the unconcealment of being takes place.
Reading the New Science "between" these rabbinic and postmodern texts, Luft argues, reveals that the "master key" Vico discovered is the uncannily poetic-poietic nature of the first humans. For the mature Vico, then, the historical world is an artwork and must be understood hermeneutically rather than epistemologically. In the very act of understanding the world Vico's poetic first men created it, and created themselves as human beings thereby. Luft's alchemical approach not only helps the reader to think outside of Cartesian subjecthood, and thereby to encounter the profound strangeness of Vico's twenty-year discovery; it also affords Luft the opportunity to engage in a wide-ranging consideration of figures and positions ranging from Philo, Cusa, Epicurus and the Stoics through to Marx, Gadamer, and Derrida. Her project is further undergirded by a thorough overview of contemporary Vico scholarship.
While much of this material is useful, and occasionally even revelatory, Luft's book is too short to accommodate comfortably all the texts and figures that she engages. Indeed, she notes in the preface that space considerations prevent her from including her entire survey of Vico scholarship. She thus directs readers to her website for the portion of the survey excluded from the book. Even with this apparatus, half of her book reads like a literature review in a dissertation rather than as part of a monograph from a senior scholar. This lit review portion is too dense, and reading it is often tedious. When working through it, it is especially infelicitous that there is no bibliography. Thus, the reader is forced to chase the book's many references back through series of Ibids to their sources. According to Luft, the bibliography-like the rest of the literature review-was excluded from the publication for reasons of length. She therefore posts an annotated bibliography for the book on her website. The decision to exclude a bibliography from a book for which one is so obviously necessary reflects poor~~i!~!~j~9g!'!1_eJ1!~_ Indeed the editors' cavalier attitude toward the book is further jevident in the overall structure of the work. It is apparent that the book Iwas cobbled together from a number of articles Luft has published over the years. While there is no problem with this in principle, in many places the seams between the articles are still showing. The same passages are repeated over and over throughout the book, evidently owing to their having appeared in a number of the articles in which the book originated. Indeed, the patchwork nature of the work is sometimes even apparent in changes in the author's idiom. Most noticeably, Luft throughout uses gender-exclusive language, with repeated references to the "first men" and with "he/hirn" as the default pronoun. However, one tenpage portion of the third chapter consciously adopts gender-inclusive language, eVidently because this was the idiom of that particular article. One of the further effects of Luft's having cobbled articles together with little revision is that where Luft has something new to say in the textthat is, newer than the article that that portion of the text reproduces -she embeds it in long, cumbersome footnotes rather than working it into the text proper. While Continental philosophers are perhaps more than anyone sympathetic to the hors de Ja texte, Luft often has way too much hors and not enough text. This makes reading difficult, especially given the absence of a bibliography. Proper editorial supervision would have forced a major revision in the whole text, either recasting the book as an article collection or forcing a substantial rewrite to turn it into a real monograph (not an article collection posing as a monograph). With the right edit this could have been a great and important book; as it stands, it is a deeply flawed book with some great and important ideas. Particularly in light of Luft's twenty-year struggle to produce this book, Cornell's editorial indifference is a profound disservice both to her and to her readers. Matthias Fritsch has written a dense and provocative book that should prompt a renewed discussion of the Marxian past and the political future of Continental philosophy. Navigating the fragile bark of emancipatory politics into a non-utopian but still better future, argues Fritsch, requires
